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INTRODUCTION

Before 2008, prosecutions of banks had been quite rare in the federal
courts, and the criminal liability of banks and bankers was not a topic that
received much public or scholarly attention. In the wake of the last financial
crisis, however, critics have begun to ask whether prosecutors adequately held
banks and bankers accountable for their crimes. Senator Jeff Merkley
complained: "[A]fter the financial crisis, the [Justice] Department appears to
have firmly set the precedent that no bank, bank employee, or bank executive
can be prosecuted."' Federal judge Jed Rakoff and many others asked why
prosecutors brought, with one or two low-level exceptions, no prosecutions of
bankers in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and whether they were
too quick to settle corporate cases by merely compelling fines and "windowdressing" compliance reforms.2 The response from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to criticism of its approach towards corporate and financial prosecutions
has ranged from stem denial that it had been remiss -as when Attorney
General Eric Holder announced in a video message in 2014 that "[t]here is no
such thing as too big to jail" and that no financial institution "should be
considered immune from prosecution" - to reform in the face of

1.

Press Release, Senator Jeff Merldey, Merkley Blasts 'Too Big to jail' Policyfor Lawbreaking
Banks, (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.merldey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merldey-blasts
-too-big-to-jail-policy-for-lawbrealdng-banks [http://perma.cc/BY2U-GUE9].

2.

Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?,
N.Y. REV. BooKs (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2o14/ol/o9/financial
-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [http://perma.cc/V5BQ-C2E9]; see also Robert
Quigley, The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal PunishmentAfter the Financial Crisis, 22
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 103 (2015); David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, too VA. L.
REv. 1405, 1410-11 (2014).

3.

Jonathan Weil, There Is Still Such a Thing as 'Too Big to Jail," BLOOMBERGVIEW (May
6, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2o14-o5-o6/there-is-still-such-a-thing
-as-too-big-to-jail [http://perma.cc/37LT-6NEL].
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acknowledged lack of public confidence in its approach -as when the DOJ in
adopted policies designed to make corporate prosecutions more effective.4
In this Essay, I describe the remarkable rise in the number of bank
prosecutions in recent years, as well as the still steeper rise in criminal penalties
imposed on banks. 2015 was the year that bank prosecutions finally came into
their own, both in the record-breaking size of the fines and in the numbers of
cases resolved. While the DOJ can claim marked achievements in recent years,
which I detail here, I nevertheless caution against treating these data as fully
answering critics' concerns. Despite the apparent rise of bank prosecutions,
important "too big to jail" concerns remain: prosecution deals are inadequate
both as punishments and as rehabilitative efforts designed to promote
compliance. Upon closer examination, the recent string of bank prosecutions,
while noteworthy, fails to address persistent concerns that deterrent fines are
not routinely imposed, that compliance tenns designed to rehabilitate firms are
not used effectively, and that individuals remain largely un-prosecuted.
In the sections that follow, I first describe the data on increasing corporate
penalties generally, as well as penalties levied by prosecutors against financial
institutions specifically, with a focus on 2015, a year in which prosecutors
obtained record bank fines and numbers of bank prosecutions.6 Second, I will
ask whether those penalties are adequate, by examining how seemingly large
sums paid may actually represent highly reduced penalties given what
prosecutors could have imposed on banks for the alleged conduct. Third, I ask
whether banks are being adequately deterred or rehabilitated, where some of
the same banks have engaged in repeated violations without suffering more
serious consequences, compliance terms appear not to be taken seriously or
compliance is unknown, and individuals are prosecuted only in a minority of
these cases. I conclude by discussing what might further enhance the ability of
2015

4.

U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL

§ 9-28.ooo,

PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS

ORGANIZATIONS (NOV. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usan/usam-9-28000-principles-fed
eral-prosecution-business-organizations [http://perma.cc/E58C-6 5 8T]; Press Release, Dep't
of Justice, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks at New York
University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. to, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy
-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school
[http://
perma.cc/CL4T-JPAR] ("Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that one's
criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was committed on behalf of a
corporation.").
5.

See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS ch. 1 (2014) [hereinafter GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL]; Brandon L. Garrett,

The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, tot VA. L. REv. 1789 (2015) [hereinafter Garrett, The
Corporate Criminal].
6.

Here, I define financial institutions broadly to include "a range of types of companies that
focus on financial transactions, including commercial banks, investment banks, insurance
companies, and brokerages." Garrett, The Corporate Criminal,supra note 5, at 1816.
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prosecutors to deter bank crime and rehabilitate banks, and I suggest that we
have reason to be optimistic that reforms will be taken seriously.
1.

THE RISE IN BANK PENALTIES

In 2015, federal prosecutors settled a record number of cases with banks,
and in the process imposed record criminal penalties, which critics had
complained DOJ had failed to do in the past.7 Corporations paid record sums
exceeding $9 billion in penalties to federal prosecutors in 2015, and paid still
more to regulators and others. In the last decade, my data show that federal
prosecutors have set new records each year in corporate fines, breaking the
ones set the previous year. The figure below illustrates these data, handcollected from federal dockets in cases of plea agreements with companies and
from deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies.

7.
8.

See supra notes 1-2.
Figure i updates data presented in GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5. The Appendix of
that book provides a detailed description of how these data were collected from public
sources, chiefly federal district court dockets, Department of Justice releases, requests made
to individual U.S. Attorney's Offices, and FOIA requests and litigation, see GARRETT, Too
BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 297-301. Each of the deferred and non-prosecution agreements is

available in an online resource. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational
Prosecution Agreements, U. VA. SCH. L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution
-agreements/home.suphp [http://perma.cc/QA9Z-R6BX] [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley,
Federal OrganizationalProsecutionAgreements]. Each of the plea agreements from 2001-2013
is
available
on
a
separate
online
resource
website.
See
Brandon
L.
Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Plea Agreements, U. VA. SCH.
L.,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea agreements/home.php
[http://perma.cc
/ 4W1HG-DKKX] [hereinafter Garrett & Ashley, Federal OrganizationalPlea Agreements]. The
2014-2015 plea agreements are in the process of being added to that resource website, and
both resource websites will soon be combined in a single resource, which will additionally
permit users to search companies by status as public or privately-held companies, size of
fine, type of crime, and other characteristics, including whether they are a financial
institution. The cases to be added online are included in the Appendices to this Essay.
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Figure i.

FEDERAL CORPORATE CRIMINAL PENALTIES,

2001-2015
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In 2015, almost $7 billion of the total $9 billion in corporate penalties paid
to federal prosecutors came from banks. The two Appendices to this Essay
detail each of the prosecution agreements reached with banks and financial
institutions from 2001 to 2014, and then in 2015, as well as the penalties
imposed in each case. Over $22 billion in penalties have been paid to federal
prosecutors by financial institutions from 2001-2015; over $15 billion was paid
just in the last five years, from 2011 to 2015-9 The figure below depicts the
startling rise in penalties paid by financial institutions, defined to include
banks and other financial institutions like hedge funds and insurance
companies. One can see how few financial institutions were prosecuted from
2001-2014, with fewer than ten cases in each year prior to 2010. The first

9.

36

In addition, banks have paid, by one estimate, almost $200 billion in at least 175 settlements
of enforcement actions since 2oo9, maldng the amounts paid as part of criminal
enforcement actions only a small fraction of the total. Jeff Cox, Misbehaving Banks Have Now
Paid $2o4B in Fines, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2o15/io/3o/misbehaving
-banks-have-now-paid-2o4b-in-fines.html [http://perma.cc/DCM6-N72F].
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billion-dollar criminal penalty was imposed on a bank (UBS) in
many more have followed.o

2009,

and

Figure 2.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION PROSECUTIONS AND PENALTIES, 2001-2015
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In 2015, a remarkable number of banks-eighty of them-finalized cases
with prosecutors. This constitutes about one-half of the organizations that
entered prosecution agreements during the entire year, whether plea
agreements" or deferred and non-prosecution agreements. Each of these bank
prosecutions is detailed in Appendix B." In 2015, bank prosecutions with large
fines, apart from the record-setting BNP Paribas case, included the cases of:
Deutsche Bank, which paid $625 million in an antitrust case; Commerzbank,

which paid $641 million; and Cr6dit Agricole, which paid $156 million in
money laundering and export violation cases. Upon closer inspection, it is not

10.

n1.

Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. o9-60033-CR-COHN
(S.D. Fl. 2009), http://lib.law.virginia.edn/Garrett/prosecution agreements/sites/default
/files/pdf/ubs.pdf [http://perma.cc/L48G-GJRN].
For the entire collection of such plea agreements, from 2001-2013, see Garrett & Ashley,

Federal OrganizationalPleaAgreements, supra note 8.
For the entire collection of such deferred and non-prosecution agreements, see Garrett

&

12.

Ashley, FederalOrganizationalProsecutionAgreements, supra note 8.
13.

See infra Appendix B.
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surprising that $7 billion of $9 billion in fines levied by federal prosecutions in
came from cases involving banks. The only really substantial settlements
from 2015 that did not involve banks were two that made up most of the $2
billion remainder: the $900 million paid by General Motors pursuant to a
deferred prosecution agreement and the $772 million paid by Alstom S.A. in a
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) case.4
The bulk of the banks that settled prosecutions in 2015 did so as part of a
"Swiss Bank Program," a remarkable effort by the DOJ's Tax Division
designed to combat marketing of illegal tax shelters. Scores of Swiss banks paid
almost $1 billion in these settlements of tax prosecutions in 2015. The DOJ's
Program was designed to give incentives, via non-prosecution agreements, to
the banks that fully cooperated and disclosed names of tax evaders in the U.S.
that the banks enabled. 5 The unusual and one-off Swiss Bank program is
winding down, but in 2016 we will still see additional cases resolved with Swiss
banks that will not receive such lenient non-prosecution deals. The first such
settlement has been announced: Bank Julius Baer & Co. recently settled in a
deferred prosecution agreement and agreed to pay $547 million.16
It is noteworthy how many financial institutions are now being
prosecuted-and with some regularity-such that they are no longer
functionally immune from criminal prosecution. In contrast to this recent
flurry of activity, very few financial institutions had been prosecuted in decades
past. It was almost vanishingly rare for banks to be convicted of crimes, as
Appendix A shows. From 2001-2012, I located just four bank convictions: those
of Cr6dit Lyonnais, Delta National Bank & Trust Co., Pamrapo Savings Bank,
2015

14.

Exhibit A, United States v.

$900,000,000 in United States Currency, 1:15-cv-07342

(S.D.N.Y. 2015), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecutionagreements/sites/default
/files/pdf/gm.pdf [http://perma.cc/UBX2-RPYJ]; Plea Agreement, United States v. Alstom
S.A.
(D.
Conn. 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases
/attachments/2ol4/12/22/alstom saplea agreement.pdf[http://perma.cc/9KH8-RCZC].
15.

Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Three Banks Reach
Resolutions under Swiss Bank Program (July 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr

/justice-department-announces-three-banks-reach-resolutions-under-swiss-bank-program
[http://perma.cc/M5VZ-ARP2].
16.

Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Criminal Charges Filed Against Bank Julius Baer of
Switzerland with Deferred Prosecution Agreement Requiring Payment of $547 Million, as
Well as Guilty Pleas of Two Julius Baer Bankers (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/criminal-charges-filed-against-bank-julius-baer-switzerland-deferred-prosecution-agree
ment [http://perma.cc/58ER-KGRF]. The Department of Justice has made materials from
each of the Swiss Bank Program cases available on a very useful website. See Swiss Bank
Program, DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program

/BG 4 S- 9 U 9 W].
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and Riggs Bank.1 7 In the past decade and before, when banks were charged,
they routinely received non-prosecution agreements not filed in court, much
less resulting in an indictment or a conviction, as Appendix A also depicts. It
was apparently a sign of additional vigilance that prosecutors slowly, in the
past few years, began to insist on deferred prosecution agreements for major
banks that are at least initially filed in court.' Prosecutors announced
convictions for SAC Capital in 2013, Japanese subsidiaries of UBS and Royal
Bank of Scotland in 2013, and Cr6dit Suisse and BNP Paribas in 2014.19 Now
prosecutors routinely pursue banks, and in some of the most serious cases, they
now seek a conviction through a guilty plea. Nevertheless, despite these
important changes, the question remains whether these agreements impose
adequate fines, function as deterrence, and facilitate the rehabilitation of banks
and bankers.
II. CRIMINAL FINES AND DETERRENCE

OF BANK CRIME

These billions of dollars in fines imposed in recent years are not all that
they appear. The staggering fines cited above are dominated by a handful of
blockbuster cases, and should not suggest that federal prosecutors have
necessarily become more aggressive across the board.20 While bank
prosecutions have increased in number and size, in general, neither the number
of companies prosecuted nor the number of public companies prosecuted has
increased since 2001.2' The number of banks prosecuted had risen modestly,
particularly from 2011-2014, and then the numbers shot up due to the Swiss

17.

Appendix A; GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 349 n.16. In addition, several small
mortgage companies and investment advisors were convicted during that time period. See
Appendix A.

18.

Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Is Penalized $2 Billion Over Madoff N.Y.
TIMEs (Jan. 7, 2014, 9:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2ol4/ol/o7/jpmorgan-settles
-with-federal-authorities-in-madoff-case/ [http://perma.cc/UQ9T-XFMK] (observing that
"the size of the fine and the rarity of a deferred-prosecution agreement-such deals are
scarcely used against giant American banks and are typically employed only when
misconduct is extreme -reflect the magnitude of the accusations").

ig.

GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 258-59.

20.

Average corporate fines have ranged from $i to $16,ooo,ooo from 2000-2012, far below the
fines imposed in the blockbuster cases involving hundreds of millions of dollars or even
billions in fines. See GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 294 (describing an increase

in average corporate fines over the past two decades, from less than $2,000,000 in average
fines per year before 2000, to over $i,ooo,ooo in average corporate fines by 2010).
21.

Id. at 261-62 (depicting numbers of federal corporate prosecutions from 1991 to 2012,
showing a rise in numbers prosecuted in the 1990s, but a decline since the 2000s, even
including cases resolved through deferred and non-prosecution agreements). To update that
data, there were i5o such prosecutions identified in 2013, and 126 in 2014, but 164 in 2015,
largely due to the Swiss Bank Program discussed infra.
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Bank Program cases in 2015. However, with the Swiss Bank Program winding
down, the number of bank prosecutions is likely to return to prior levels of
roughly ten per year in the future.
One might counter that it is not the number of cases but the size of the
penalties in the largest cases that has exponentially increased and should be our
focus. Yet even these fines are often not all that they could be. In general, in
almost half of the deferred and non-prosecution agreements with companies
from 2001-2012, no criminal fine was imposed at all.' When sentencing
calculations were provided, the agreements typically stated that fines were at
the bottom or below the bottom of the applicable range. I also found that for
public companies prosecuted from 2001-2012, fines averaged only 0.04 percent
of market capitalization, while total payments made to prosecutors averaged
just 0.09 percent.' To be sure, very few prosecutions of financial institutions,
as the Appendices illustrate, involve no criminal fine at all. However, from the
information disclosed, it appears the fines imposed were often dramatically
reduced. To provide one example: in the Standard Chartered case, the bank
admitted to having processed over $240 billion in illegal transactions with
Iranian clients, resulting in almost $7 billion in pre-tax profits, yet the bank
paid only $674 million in combined civil and criminal penalties.25
The largest criminal penalty of all time is another remarkable case in point.
The bulk of the corporate criminal fines in 2015 came from the single recordshattering case of the French bank BNP Paribas, which paid $4 billion to
prosecutors and an additional almost $5 billion to regulators and local
prosecutors.2

The prosecutors described a pattern of years of deliberate

deception designed to conceal transactions with sanctioned regimes,
particularly with Sudan. Despite the fact that federal prosecutors highlighted

22.

GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL, supra note 5, at 69.

23.

Id. at 150 (noting that only thirty deferred or non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2012
included a guidelines calculation, and only three of those noted fines at the top of the
applicable range).

24.

Id. at 70.

25.

For a detailed discussion of the case, see Kristie Than, The Price offustice: Deferred Prosecution
Agreements in the Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 631
(2014).

26.

Plea

agreement

at

1-2,

U.S.

v.

BNP

Paribas

S.A.,

June

27,

2015,

at

http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2014/06/30/plea-agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2XE-U2F3]; see also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, BNP Paribas
Sentenced for Conspiring to Violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and

the
Trading
with
the
Enemy
Act
(May 1, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-sentenced-conspiring-violate
-international-emergency-economic-powers-act-and
[http://perma.cc/Q628-2K5Y].
The
plea was negotiated in 2014 but the judgment was entered on May 1, 2015. Court Docket,
USA v. BNP Paribas S.A., Docket No. 1:14-cr-00460 (S.D.N.Y. July 09, 2014).
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-

how upper-level management condoned the sanctions violations and how
bankers tried to cover up the transactions -calling it "truly a tour de fraud"
no individual bank employees were charged.' The almost $9 billion in
combined penalties -representing the total proceeds of the criminal activity
prosecutors felt they could prove moved through the U.S. financial systemmay have seemed quite large; even just the portion denominated as a criminal
penalty was record-sized. But in fact, over $190 billion in transactions may
have been involved, and the fine calculation was, as is typical in such cases,
highly non-transparent.8 Forfeiting just the proceeds of a crime is certainly a
starting point in a criminal case, but a corporation may also face fines of up to
double the gain (or harm to victims). 9 BNP paid only $140 million
denominated as a criminal fine for purposes of punishment; the remainder of
the payment was denominated as forfeiture 0 (although one advantage of that
denomination is that the funds may be used to compensate individuals "who
may have been harmed by the regimes of Sudan, Iran and Cuba" -an effort
that the DOJ is "exploring"). 1 Thus, the record penalty may actually be far
lower than what could have been imposed, and the lack of transparency in the
calculation of the fine amount makes it difficult to know how much larger the
fine could have been and what kind of bargain prosecutors struck.
III. BANK RECIDIVISM, DETERRENCE, AND REHABILITATION

Recidivism by major banks further calls into question the effectiveness of
these prosecution agreements. Federal prosecutors have repeatedly settled cases
with the same major banks in a short span of years. Recidivist financial

Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP ParibasAdmits Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9
Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (June 30, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://dealbook
.nytimes.con/2o4/06/30/bnp-paribas-pleads-guilty-in-sanctions-case/
[http://perma.cc
/MZY8-C 7 9 2].
28. Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, BNP Paribas Agrees to Plead Guilty to Conspiring to Process
Transactions Through the U.S. Financial System For Sudanese, Iranian, and Cuban
27.

Entities Subject To U.S. Economic Sanctions (June 30, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao-

sdny/pr/bnp-paribas-agrees-plead-guilty-conspiring-process-transactions-through-us-finan
cial [http://perma.cc/HCT7-NVT8]; Joseph Ax et al., U.S. Imposes Record Fine on BNP in
Sanctions Warning to Banks, REUTERS (July 1, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us

-bnp-paribas-setdement-idUSKBNoF52HA20140701 [http://perma.cc/ZJ85-F5G8].
29.

18 U.S.C. § 3 57 1(d) (2012) (alternative fine based on gain or loss).

30.

The forfeitures were under 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. 2461(c). See Consent
Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, U.S. v. BNP Paribas S.A., No. 1:14-cr-00460-LGS,
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2o14/o6/3o
/consent-preliniinary-forfeiture-money-judgement.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3VW-Z7EU].

31.

BNP ParibasSentenced for Conspiring to Violate the InternationalEmergency Economic Powers
Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, supra note 26.
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institutions include AIG (deferred and non-prosecution agreements entered by
two subsidiaries in 2004 and a non-prosecution agreement in 2006), Barclays
(a deferred prosecution agreement in 2010, a non-prosecution agreement in
2012, and a guilty plea pending), Cr6dit Suisse (a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2009 and a plea agreement in 2014), HSBC (a non-prosecution
agreement in 2001 and a deferred prosecution agreement in 2012), JP Morgan
(a non-prosecution agreement in 2011, a deferred prosecution agreement in
2014, and a plea agreement pending currently), Lloyds (a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2009 and a deferred prosecution agreement in 2014), the Royal
Bank of Scotland (a deferred prosecution agreement in 2013, a guilty plea by a
subsidiary in 2013, and a guilty plea currently pending), UBS (a deferred
prosecution agreement in 2009, a non-prosecution agreement in 2011, a nonprosecution agreement in 2012, a guilty plea by a subsidiary in 2013, and a
guilty plea currently pending), and Wachovia (a deferred prosecution
agreement in 2010 and a non-prosecution agreement in 2011).2 While the cases
cited are only the instances in which banks were repeatedly criminally
prosecuted, still more banks have settled multiple civil enforcement cases with
regulators (in some instances large numbers of civil cases)." One wonders how
seriously prosecutors take recidivism among major financial institutions and
how effective prosecutions have been in changing any underlying culture of
law-breaking.

32.

For links to each of the pending plea agreements, see Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Five
Major
Banks
Agree
to
Parent-Level
Guilty
Pleas
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.jusdce.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas
[https://perma.cc/76FD-HC5H] [hereinafter Press Release, Five Major Banks]. The Royal
Bank of Scotland and UBS each had Japanese subsidiaries plead guilty in 2013 as described
here, see Press Release, Dep't of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited Agrees to Plead
Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark Interest

Rates (Feb.

6, 2013),

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rbs-securities-japan-limited-agrees

-plead-guilty-connecdon-long-running-manipulation-libor

[http://perma.cc/SV2B-XHL2];

United States v. UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov

/criminal-vns/case/ubssecurides
33.

[http://perma.cc/2W2X-97WT].

See Cox, supra note 9 (reporting results of study of bank penalties, noting that Bank of

America had settled thirty-four cases, paying $77 billion in penalties; JP Morgan Chase had
settled twenty-six cases, paying over $40 billion in penalties; and Citigroup had settled
eighteen cases, resulting in over $18 billion in penalties). Unlike criminal penalties,
however, civil settlements may be tax deductible-a source of criticism that civil penalty

amounts may be in part borne by taxpayers. See, e.g., Phineas Baxandall & Michelle Surka,
Settling for a Lack of Accountability?, U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
EDUCATION FUND (Dec. 2015) http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/USPIRG
SettlementsReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/BAV6-LWHZ]; Aruna Viswanatha & David
Henry,JP Morgan Settlement Could Cost Bank Closer to $9 Billion, THOMPSON REUTERS (Oct.
22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-penalties-idUSBRE99L19720131022

[http://perma.cc/RL25-WCHE].
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Still more mammoth bank cases lumber along in the courts, including
several major pending cases that involve repeat-offender banks. In 2015, five
major banks agreed to plead guilty in cases relating to foreign exchange
(FOREX) currency manipulation. Those banks have not yet been sentenced
in the federal district court, 5 but assuming the judge approves the negotiated
plea agreements in their current form, the banks will pay federal prosecutors $5
billion more in fines, making for another year of record-setting corporate and
bank penalties. Three of the banks -Barclays, JPMorgan and UBS -had been
previously prosecuted in recent years. Prosecutors did say that UBS, when
pleading guilty to the new FOREX violations in 2015, was in breach of an
earlier 2012 agreement regarding LIBOR manipulation. 6 UBS then paid a $203
million fine for that breach. Yet the puzzling consequence of the UBS breach of
its prior prosecution agreement was a far smaller fine than what the other banks
agreed to pay in the FOREX cases. 7 The consequences of recidivism appear
highly uneven. The outcomes suggest that the "too big to jail" argument -the
notion that banks are so vital to the economy that their crimes should be
excused or treated leniently- retains currency, and applies even to banks that
commit crimes repeatedly.
It is not clear that these banks are being rehabilitated through compliance
terms either. These terms aim to prevent future crimes in a way that the
payment of fines - ultimately borne by the shareholders - may not accomplish.
We know little about how the compliance terms of prosecution agreements are
being implemented, since the process is rarely described publicly by companies
or prosecutors, and the reports of independent monitors who are sometimes
tasked with supervising compliance are typically not made public.
The HSBC case is a rare case in which the summaries of monitor reports
have been made public because Judge John Gleeson insisted that there be some
reporting to the court."' As a result, we know that several years into the five-

34.

See Press Release, Five Major Banks, supra note 32.

35.

See, e.g., USA v. Barclays PLC, Docket No. 3:15-cr-00077 (D. Conn. May 20, 2015).

36.

Id. ("According to the factual statement of breach attached to UBS's plea agreement, UBS

engaged in deceptive FX trading and sales practices after it signed the LIBOR nonprosecution agreement ...
.").
37.

While UBS was in breach, it also received conditional immunity from prosecution for the
new violations since it reported them to prosecutors. Kevin McCoy & Kevin

Johnson,
(May

20,

Five Banks
2015),

Guilty of Rate-Rigging, Pay More

than $5B,

USA

TODAY

http://www.usatoday.com/wlna/money/2o15/o5/2o/billions-in-bank-fx

-settlements/27638443/ [http://perma.cc/WL78-B533].
38. Judge Gleeson ordered an entire thousand-page monitor's report made public in the HSBC
case, calling it a "judicial document" relevant to his preliminary approval of the deferred
prosecution and subject to judicial supervision, and therefore subject to a public right of
access under the common law and the First Amendment. Memorandum and Order at 3-4,

United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-oo 7 6 3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), ECF
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year term of a deferred prosecution agreement with HSBC, the monitor has
reported that compliance is still far from adequate and that reforms met with
outright resistance, including in HSBC's U.S. investment bank.39 The bank has
reported that the monitor identified additional "instances of potential financial
crimes." 40 The HSBC case raises the question of whether other independent
monitors have uncovered similar failures to comply, but in reports that have
not been made public. Major banks are massive institutions with global
operations, and without substantial compliance efforts, the process may
proceed slowly and with poor results. In more recent cases, prosecutors have
insisted on guilty pleas, with the result that banks are placed on probation,
with more formal court supervision, and with violation of probation as a
potential consequence of non-compliance. Whether stricter oversight of
compliance results from guilty pleas by banks remains to be seen.
Moreover, while banks pay fines, the actual bankers are not usually
charged, much less sentenced to any time, making the individual-level
deterrence of criminal conduct still more equivocal. I have found in a study of
individual prosecutions accompanying prosecution agreements that among the
306 deferred and non-prosecution agreements from 2001-2014, 66 cases
involved financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment banks,
insurance companies, and brokerages. Individual prosecutions of officers or
employees accompanied a little over one third or 23 of the 66 cases. Further,
the individuals prosecuted were typically low-level employees;' perhaps as a

No. 52. Judge Gleeson highlighted how the case involves "matters of great public concern,"
although partial sealing or redaction might be warranted if "narrowly tailored." Id. at 9-10.

That ruling is on appeal to the Second Circuit. Nate Raymond, HSBC Money Laundering
Report's Release Likely Delayed: U.S. Judge, REUTERs (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.reuters
.com/article/us-hsbc-moneylaundering-idUSKCNoVI28H [http://perma.cc/656E-BVJV].
39.

Greg Farrell, HSBC Falls Short on Compliance, Monitor to Report, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 30, 2015 3:10 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2oS-o3-3o/hsbc-falls
-short-on-compliance-monitor-said-to-report [https://perma.cc/V3VC-YIVX5] (describing
a "critical, 1,ooo page report" by monitor which "raises doubts about how effective the
government's use of deferred- and non-prosecution agreements is in reining in wrongdoing

and changing culture at the world's largest banks"); Christie Smythe, Judge Lets Sun Shine
on Secret HSBC Money Laundering Report, BLOOMBERG Bus. (Jan. 29, 2016 12:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/aricles/2o16-ol-29/judge-lets-sun-shine-on-secret-hsbc
-report-on-money-laundering_[http://perma.cc/D7H3-CSP7].
40.

HSBC's 2015 Annual Report noted that while the Monitor found that HSBC had made

"progress"

in compliance,

of that progress,

instances

he also "expressed significant
of potential financial

crime

concerns about the pace
and systems

and

controls

deficiencies." Frances Coppola, HSBC's Catalogue ofLawsuits, FORBEs (Feb. 28, 2016,
10:23 AM EST), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2o16/o2/28/hsbcs-catalog-of
-lawsuits/#356cod9e4d27 [https://perma.cc/DR2W-2T2E].
41.

Garrett, The Corporate Criminal,supra note

42.

Id. at 1802.
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s, at

1816.
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result, these individual prosecutions generally resulted in fairly low sentences
for those that received any jail time.
In response to the widespread criticism, the non-prosecution of bank
employees may slowly be starting to change. The DOJ announced, as noted, a
set of new policies in fall 2015, revising charging guidelines and sharpening the
focus on individuals in corporate crime cases." A Delaware bank, Wilmington
Trust, was indicted and high-level officers charged, including the former
President and CFO.4 s Two LIBOR rigging cases went to trial in the Southern
District of New York, resulting in convictions of former traders. To be sure,
none of these cases answers the criticism that bankers were not charged after
the last financial crisis; public concerns may understandably be more focused
on the conduct that preceded the financial crisis than more recent frauds or
violations with less potentially catastrophic consequences.4
CONCLUSION

Bank prosecutions, virtually unheard of before the past decade, now
dominate federal corporate criminal practice. Prosecutors in the United States
have taken on complex financial institutions like never before, and in a way
that their counterparts around the world have never done as aggressively. The
billion dollar fines that prosecutors now routinely negotiate, and the sheer
numbers of banks they target, send a deterrent message to the entire financial
industry. They also lead to perhaps more punitive results than the use of civil

43.

Id. at 181o-11.

44.

See Memorandum from Sally Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the
Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys i (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov
/dag/file/769036/download [http://perma.cc/4U4P-JMGZ]; DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-28.ooo, Principles of Federal Prosecution Of Business
Organizations (revised in November 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000

-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations

[http://perma.cc/52EH-

9 UT7].

Then again, some predict prosecutors will over time "retreat" from an "all-or-nothing"

approach towards the Yates Memo. See Chris Bruce, U.S. Will Retreat on Yates Memo, Former
DOJ Official Predicts, BLOOMBERG L.: BANKING (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.bna.com/us

-retreat-yates-n57982063844/

[https://perma.cc/KG9E-VCVQJ.

Others,

this

author

included, have argued that in context these new changes are not dramatic. See Brandon L.

Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecution, tot VA. L. REV. ONLINE 6o
(2015); Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ
Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, tot VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015).
45.

See Maureen Milford, Wilmington Trust Indictment Unique in Financial World, DELAWARE
ONLINE

(Aug.

9,

2015),

http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/1ocal/2o5/o8/o9

/wilmington-trust-indictment-unique-financial-world/31394625/
-A44N].
46.

[https://perma.cc/2WFK

For criticism focusing squarely on financial crisis related failures to prosecution, see, for
example, Rakoff, supra note 2 and Zaring, supra note 2.
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alternatives, such as enforcement actions brought under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),'
which has been responsible for the bulk of the civil penalties imposed on banks
post-financial crisis. The criminal penalties paid by banks in 2015 were no
aberration but part of a developing trend that is likely to continue in the years
to come, even if the numbers of banks prosecuted will likely decline with the
Swiss Bank Program winding down.
Despite the massive criminal penalties, it is hard to evaluate the significance
or adequacy of federal criminal prosecution efforts, and deep concerns remain.
Recidivists face little in the way of additional punishment; calculations of
penalties are non-transparent and fines may not even be as high as profits from
criminal acts; compliance changes are implemented with very little public
information; and individuals often remain unprosecuted. How can bank
prosecutions be used to deter banks better and to rehabilitate them to prevent
future crime? The move towards seeking guilty pleas from banks is an
important step in the right direction. In the past, banks could avoid
consequences for repeat criminal prosecutions since they lacked a criminal
record, having settled prior cases using non-prosecution or deferred
prosecution agreements. Now that prosecutors more often insist upon a
criminal conviction in the form of a guilty plea in front of a judge, future
violations may result in court-supervised compliance and penalties. The
compliance terms of these agreements should themselves be taken more
seriously, with public accountability in the form of monitors' reports, and
careful auditing of compliance to test its effectiveness. If banks know that
independent monitors will be testing compliance and reporting to a court and
to the public, the compliance may be far more rigorous. Finally, prosecution of
individuals may become more common if the new DOJ guidance takes hold
and results in more charging of culpable individuals. Whether that occurs
remains to be seen.
More resources may be dedicated to bank prosecutions, perhaps in future
administrations.' 8 Reform may also come from Congress, absent sufficient
changes in practice from within the DOJ, or through enhanced supervision by
federal judges. Federal legislation could require: (1) greater judicial supervision

47.

Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). For an insightful and quite detailed analysis of the use of
FIRREA post-financial crisis, see Nan S. Ellis, Steven B. Dow & David Safavian, Use of
FIRREA To Impose Liability in the Wake of the Global FinancialCrisis: A New Weapon in the
Arsenal To Prevent FinancialFraud, 18 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 119 (2015).

48.

Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has proposed dedicating still more resources towards
corporate

and

bank prosecutions,

accompanying

a

shift

in

enforcement

priorities.

See Hillary Clinton: Wall Street Should Work for Main Street, HILLARY FOR
AM., http://www.hillaryclinton.com/p/briefing/factsheets/2oi5/1o/o8/wall-street-work-for
-main-street [http://perma.cc/HR64-FEL8].
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of deferred prosecution agreements, including through revisions to the Speedy
Trial Act;4 9 (2) revisions to the organizational sentencing guidelines to ensure
deterrent fines; (3) longer statutes of limitations to assist in individual
prosecutions;50 and (4) greater transparency in corporate settlements, for
which legislation recently passed in the U.S. Senate. 1 These improvements
would all be steps in the right direction, and might also give better incentives
to prosecutors to focus on individual prosecutions, more stringent compliance
oversight, and stronger penalties for recidivist corporations.
While real changes should be made to strengthen prosecutions of financial
institutions, I am also optimistic that the public and political scrutiny of these
cases will continue to push prosecutors to respond to the critics. If they do not,
other regulators, Congress, and the judiciary may step in. As never before,
prosecutors have made the targeting of banks centrally important as a tool for
safeguarding the public from fraud and money laundering; enforcement
actions against banking violations have grown; and post-Dodd-Frank 2
regulation of banks has steadily increased in its reach and complexity. 3 Those
regulations, among other changes less related to criminal accountability,
incentivize whistleblowers to come forward, with the goal of encouraging
individuals within banks to report financial misconduct to regulators and to
prosecutors.' While the role of criminal law is and should be limited to only
the most severe misconduct, with civil enforcement addressing regulatory
violations, prosecutors have come to better appreciate the importance of
criminal accountability for truly serious financial crimes. The aftermath of the
financial crisis brought home how important it is for even the largest and the

49.

For a discussion ofhow the Speedy Trial Act, Pub. L. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012)), permits any deferral of a prosecution and for a proposal that
organization-specific factors be added to the statute, see Garrett, The Corporate Criminal,
supra note 5, at 1842-44.

50.

For a discussion of possible legislation regarding each of these topics, see Garrett, The
Corporate Criminal,supra note 5, at 1839-45.

51.

The "Truth in Settlements Act" passed in the Senate on Sept. 21, 2015. See Truth in
Settlements Act, S. 1109, 11 4 th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Sept. 21, 2015).

52.

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).

53.

For a description of the more than thousands of pages of regulations issued by federal
agencies to implement Dodd-Frank and areas in which regulations still have yet to be
drafted or finalized, see Dodd-Frank Progress Report, Third Quarter 2015, DAVIS
POLK, http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Q32015_Dodd.Frank .Progress.Report
.pdf [http://perma.cc/R8GV-USHJ].

54.

For a description of the SEC Office of the Whistleblower, and the relevant statute and SEC
regulations, see, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 7 8u-6(h)(1)(B) (2012); Office of the
Whistleblower, Claim an Award, SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about

/offices/owb/owb-awards.shtml [http://perma.cc/V99D-YFPB]; Final Rules, http://www
.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/reg-21f.pdf [https://perma.cc/JG3L-K5VX].
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most powerful banks and bankers to be held accountable, including for crimes.
In the future, hopefully the rise of bank prosecutions will result not just in
record monetary penalties, but also in lasting reforms that effectively prevent
the recurrence of serious financial crimes.
Brandon L. Garrett is a Justice Thurgood MarshallDistinguished Professor of Law,
University of Virginia School of Law. He would like to thank Ankur Desai for
superlative research assistance and to UVA reference librarianJon Ashley for his
tireless and ongoing work assisting with data collection and maintaining online
resources concerningcorporateprosecutions.
Preferred Citation: Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise ofBank Prosecutions, 126 YALE
L.J. F. 33 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-rise-of-bank
-prosecutions.

Appendix A.

FEDERAL BANK PROSECUTIONS, 2001-2014 (BY YEAR)

Year

Conviction,
DP, or
NP"

Crime"

HSBC

2001

NP

Secunrities
frand

BDO Seidman

2002

DP

Accounting

Fulcrum Services,
Inc.

2002

Conviction

Money
Laundering

ist Union Transfer

2
2003

C

and Telegraph, Inc.

Conviction

Money
Laundering

Banco Popular de
Puerto Rico

2003

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

2003

DP

Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce

55.

frand

CriminalFine

Total Criminal
Penaltrin

$

Company

$o

o
$

$32,000,000

$272,734
$43,200,000

Accounting
fraud

DP refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NP refers to a non-prosecution
agreement.

56.

The crime column describes the primary offense category if multiple criminal offenses were
named.

s.
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The total criminal penalty column includes sums denoted as a criminal fine, together with
any forfeiture, restitution, community service payment, or other sum paid to prosecutors.
That total penalty amount does not reflect additional sums paid separately to regulators,
non-federal prosecutors, or enforcement authorities in other countries.
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Merrill Lynch

2003

NP

AIG Financial
Products Corp.

2004

AIG-FP PAGIC
Equity Holding
Company

False

Statements

$o

$950,000

NP

Securities
fraud

$8ooooooo

$8ooooooo

2004

DP

Securities
frauditie

AmSouth Bancorp

2004

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$40,000

$8o,ooo

CDR Enterprises

2004

..
Conviction

False
Satee

$o

$o

Consolidated
Brokerage
Company, Inc.

2004

Conviction

Fraud

$0

$0

Credit Lyonnais

2004

Conviction

False
Statements

$100,ooo,ooo

$1oo000000

Edward D. Jones

2004

DP

Secunrities
frand

$o

$o

General Electric
(GE)

2004

NP

FCPA

$16,000,000

$16,000,000

MAAF Assurances
S.A.

2004

Conviction

False
Statements

$10,ooo,ooo

Bank of New York

2005

NP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$38,000,000

$76,000,000

Consolidated
Investments, Inc.

2005

Conviction

Fraud

$500,000

$1,907,400

GAF Financial
Services Inc.

2005

Conviction

Money
Laundering

$0

$o

KPMG

2005

DP

Tax

$128,000,000

$128,000,000

Riggs Bank/ Riggs
National Corp

2005

Conviction

Money
Laundering

$16,ooo,ooo

$16,ooo,ooo

AIG

2006

NP

Securities
Fraud

$0

$25,000,000

BankAtlantic

2006

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$10,ooo,ooo

$10,00,000

German Bank HVB

2006

DP

Tax

$16,195,999

$32,391,998

HealthSouth Corp.

2006

NP

Securities
Fraud

$o0

$o

Mellon Bank

2006

NP

Theft

$18.130,ooo

$36,260,ooo

$325,000,000

$325,000,000

$5,482,363

$10,964,726

Statements

Prudential Equity
Group, LLC

2006

NP

Securities
Fraud

El Paso

2007

NP

FCPA
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Securities
207rPaeuriie

$55,000,000

$iio,ooo,ooo

Fraud

$0

$20,000,000

DPFraud

Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Rhode
Island

2007

NP

Omega Advisors

2007

NP

FCPA

$500,000

$1,000,000

NETeller PLC

2007

DP

Gambling

$136,000,000

$272,000,000

Union Bank of
California

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$21,600,000

$43,200,000

2007

United Bank for
Africa

$io,668,662

NP

Obstruction
ofJustice

$

2007

Beacon Rock
Capital LLC

2008

. .
Conviction

Securities
Fraud

$6ooooo

$6ooooo

E-Gold Ltd

2008

Conviction

Money
Laundering

$600,000

$2,350,000

Pac Equities, Inc.

2oo8

Conviction

Securities
Fraud

$0

$10,362,690

Sigile

2008

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$o

$30,000,000

Repblic Services,
Inc.

2008

NP

Immigration

$i,ooo,ooo

$5,ooo,ooo

Unum Group

2008

NP

Fraud

$5,550,000

$5,550,000

Alaska State
Mortgage
Company

2009

Conviction

Fraud

$91,479

$91,479

CapitalMoe
Management and
Asset Group

2009

Conviction

Money

$i2,800

$1,508,321

Credit Suisse AG

2009

DP

IEEPA

$o

$536,000,000

plcd

2009

DP

IEEPA

$o

$350,000,000

Optimal Group

2009

NP

Gambling

$o

$38,364,836

UBS AG

2009

DP

Tax

$o

$1,16o,ooo,ooo

Health Care
Fraud

$o

$16ooooooo

Lloyds TSB Bank

Laundering

WellCare Health
Plans, Inc.
ABN AMRO Bank
N.V. (now Royal
Bank of Scotland
NV)

2010

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$o

$1,oo5,oooooo

Barclays Bank

2010

DP

IEEPA

$o

$298,000,000

BL Trading

2010

DP

Fraud

$o

$364,810

DeutscheBankAG

2010

NP

Tax

$o

$1,107,266,306

First Funding
Crptnin,

2010

Conviction

Tax

$148,ooo

$584,284

Corporation, II
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General
Reinsurance Corp.

$19,500,000

NP

Secunrities
Fraud

$

2010
2010

DP

Fraud

$18,700,000

$18,700,000

2010

NP

violations

$13,500,000

$13,500,000

2010

Conviction

Money
Laundering

$o

Trinity Trust
Financial Services,
LLC

2010

Conviction

Fraud

$0

$3,546,418

Wachovia

2010

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$50,ooo,ooo

$50,ooo,ooo

Aon Corp.

2011

NP

FCPA

$1,764,000

$1,764,000

Bana ement LC

2011

DP

Fraud

$0

$24,224,832

CommunityOne
Bank

2011

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$o

$8ooo00

GE Funding
Capital Market
Services, Inc.

2011

NP

Antitrust

$40,000,000

$100,ooo,ooo

Islamic Investment
Co. of the Gulf
(Bahamas) Ltd.

2011

NP

Tax

$4,508,000

$49,584,000

JCMorgan

2011

NP

Antitrust

$o

$o

Ocean Bank

2011

DP

Bank Secrecy
Act

$o

$21,996,000

UBS AG

2011

NP

Antitrust

$o

$o

Wachovia

2011

NP

Antitrust

$o

$o

Barclays BankPLC

2012

NP

Fraud

$16o,ooo,ooo

$16o,ooo,ooo

BDO USA, LLP

2012

DP

Tax

$o

$31,136,546

2012

NP

Secnties
Fraud

$0

$12,000,000

Louis Berger
Group
Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.

ERISA

(MetLife)
Pamrapo Savings
Bank

Chase &

Diamondback

Capital
Management, LLC
HSBC Bank
U.S.A., N.A., and
HSBC Holdings
plc
ING Bank, N.V.

Bank Secrecy
Act$o

$2,512,000,000

2012

DP

IEEPA

$o

$619,000,000

Bank Secrecy

$200,000,000

2012

DP

$o

Inc.

Act

UBS AG

2012

NP

Fraud

$400,000,000

$400,000,000

MoneyGram Int'l,
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Cooperatieve
Centrale
2013

DP

Fraud

$325,000,000

$325,000,000

2013

Conviction

Accounting
Fraud

$

$1,087,294

Liechtensteinische
Landesbanke

2013

NP

Tax

$o

$23,841,542

Mercer S.M.E. Inc.

2013

Conviction

Antitrust

$15,ooo

$15,ooo

Royal Bank of
Scotland plc

2013

DP

Fraud

$150,000,000

$150,000,000

UBS Securities
Japan Co. Ltd.

2013

Conviction

Fraud

$100,000,000

$100,000,400

Wegelin

2013

Conviction

Fraud

$22,050,000

$57,871,400

Bank Leumi Group

2014

DP

Tax

$41,230,695

$198,230,695

Credit Suisse

2014

Conviction

Tax

$1,136,988,986

$1,803,488,986

2014

NP

Fraud

$25,000,000

$25,000,000

Bank Secrecy

$o

$1,700,000,000

$175,000,000

$175,000,000

$1,500,000

$1,500,000

Raiffeisen-

Boerenleenbank
B.A. ("Rabobank")
GB Check Cashing,
LLC

Jefferies

Group

LLC

JPMorgan Chase

DP

Act

Bank, N.A.

2014

Lloyds Banldng
Group PLC

2014

DP

Oicoss, LLC

2014

Conviction

Fraud
Unlicensed
Money

Transfer
Sulnlrust
Mortgage, Inc.
Swisspartners
Investment
Network AG
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2014

NP

Fraud

$0

$3,500,000

2014

NP

Antitrust

$o

$3,500,000
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Appendix B.

FEDERAL BANK PROSECUTIONS,

2015

Company

Year

Conviction
o
s

Crime"

Criminal Fine

Total Criminal
Pe
mil6o

Aarganlische
Kantonalbank

2015

NP

Tax

$1,983,000

$1,983,000

ARVEST Privatbank
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$1,044,000

$1,044,000

Banca Credinvest SA

2015

NP

Tax

$3,022,000

$3,022,000

Cantone Ticino

2015

NP

Tax

$3,393,000

$3,393,000

Banca Intermobiliare di
Investimenti e Gestioni
(Suisse) SA

2015

NP

Tax

$o0

$o

Bank CIC (Schweiz)

2015

NP

Tax

$3,281,000

$3,281,000

Bank Coop, AG

2015

NP

Tax

$3,223,000

$3,223,000

BankEM
Genossenschaft

2015

NP

Tax

$400,000

$400,000

BankJ. Safra Sarasin
SA

2015

NP

Tax

$85,809,000

$85,809,000

Bank La Roche & Co.
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$9,296,000

$9,296,000

Bank Linth LLB AG

2015

NP

Tax

$4,150,000

$4,150,000

Bank Sparhafen Zurich
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$1,81o,ooo

$1,81o,ooo

Bank Zweiplus AG

2015

NP

Tax

$1,089,000

$1,089,000

Banque Bohhote & Cie
SA

2015

NP

Tax

$624,ooo

$624,ooo

Banque Cantonale du
Jura SA

2015

NP

Tax

$970,000

$970,000

Banque Cantonale du
Valais

2015

NP

Tax

$2,311,000

$2,311,000

Banque Cantonale du

2015

NP

Tax

$41,677,000

$41,677,000

Banca dello Stato del

58.

DP refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NP refers to a non-prosecution
agreement.

59.

The crime describes the primary offense category if multiple criminal offenses were named.

6o. The total penalty includes sums denoted as a criminal fine, together with any forfeiture,
restitution, community service payment, or other sum paid to prosecutors. That total
penalty amount does not reflect additional sums paid separately to regulators, non-federal
prosecutors, or enforcement authorities in other countries.
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Vaudoise
Banque Cantonale
Neuchateloise

2015

NP

Tax

$1,123,000

$1,123,000

Banque Heritage SA

2015

NP

Tax

$3,846,000

$3,846,000

Banque Internationale a
Luxembourg (Suisse)
SA

2015

NP

Tax

$9,710,000

$9,710,000

BanquePasche SA

2015

NP

Tax

$7,229,000

$7,229,000

Banque Privee Edmond
de Rothschild (Suisse)
SA & Banca Privata
Edmond de Rothschild
(Lugano) S

2015

NP

Tax

$45,245,000

$45,245,000

Baumann & Cie,
Banquiers

2015

NP

Tax

$7,700,000

$7,700,000

BBVA (Suiza) SA

2015

NP

Tax

$10,390,000

$10,390,000

Berner Kantonalbank
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$4,619,000

$4,619,000

BHF-Bank (Schweiz)
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$1,768,ooo

$1,768,ooo

BNP Paribas S.A.

2015

Conviction

IEEPA

$140,000,000

$4,486,800,400

BNP-Paribus (Suisse)
SA

2015

NP

Tax

$59,783,000

$59,783,000

Bordier & CIE

2015

NP

Tax

$7,827,000

$7,827,000

BSI SA

2015

NP

Tax

$211,000,000

$211,000,000

CommerceWest Bank

2015

DP

Bank
Secrecy
Act

$1,000,000

$2,219,783

Commerzbank AG

2015

DP

Bank
Secrecy
Act

$79,000,000

$641,000,000

Corner Banca SA

2015

NP

Tax

$5,o68,ooo

$5,o68,ooo

Courts & Co. Ltd.

2015

NP

Tax

$78,484,000

$78,484,000

Credit Agricole (Suisse)
SA

2015

NP

Tax

$99,211,000

$99,211,000

Credit Agricole
Corporate &
Investment Bank

2015

DP

IEEPA

$o

$156,000,000

Credito Privato
Commerciale in
liquidazione SA

2015

NP

Tax

$348,900

$348,900

SA

2015

NP

Tax

$31,026,000

$31,026,000

DeultscheBankAG

2015

DP

Antitrust

$625,000,000

$625,000,000

Deutsche Bank (Suisse)
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Dreyfus Sons & Co.
Ltd. Banquiers

2015

NP

Tax

$2,161,ooo

$2,161,ooo

E. Gutzwiller & Cie,
Banquiers

2015

NP

Tax

$1,556,000

$1,556,000

2015

NP

Tax

$29,988,000

$29,988,000

2015

NP

Tax

$2,066,000

$2,066,000

Falcon Private BankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$i,8o6,ooo

$i,8o6,ooo

Finacor S.A.

2015

NP

Tax

$295,000

$295,000

Finter Bank Zurich AG

2015

NP

Tax

$5,414,000

$5,414,000

Gonet & Cie

2015

NP

Tax

$11,454,000

$11,454,000

Graubundner
Kantonalbank

2015

NP

Tax

$3,616,000

$3,616,000

Habib Bank AG Zurich

2015

NP

Tax

$9,400,000

$9,400,000

2015

NP

Secrecy

$o

$3,036,969

EFG Bank European
Financial Group SA,
Geneva (EFG Group) &

EFG BankAG (EFG
Bank)
ShaaseAG

Hong Kong
Entertainment

Bank

(Overseas)

Act

Investments, Ltd.

Hyposwiss Private
2015

NP

Tax

$1,109,000

$1,109,000

Lenzburg AG

2015

NP

Tax

$560,000

$560,000

KBL (Switzerland) Ltd.

2015

NP

Tax

$18,792,000

$18,792,000

LBBW (Schweiz) AG

2015

NP

Tax

$34,000

$34,000

Luzerner Kantonalbank
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$11,031,000

$11,031,000

Maerki Baumann
Co., AG

2015

NP

Tax

$23,920,000

$23,920,000

MediBankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$826,000

$826,000

(Schweiz) AG

2015

NP

Tax

$1,172,000

$1,172,000

Migros Bank AG

2015

NP

Tax

$15,037,000

$15,037,000

Kantonalbank

2015

NP

Tax

$856,000

$856,000

PBZ Verwaltungs AG

2015

NP

Tax

$5,570,000

$5,570,000

SA

2015

NP

Tax

$15,365,000

$15,365,000

PKB PrivatbankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$6,328,000

$6,328,000

PostFinanceAG

2015

NP

Tax

$2,000,000

$2,000,000

Bank Geneve S.A.

&

Hypothekarbank

Mercantil Bank

Nidwaldner

Piguet Galland & Cie
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PrivatbankBelleriveAG

2015

NP

Tax

$57,000

$57,000

Privatbank IHAG
Zurich AG

2015

NP

Tax

$7,453,000

$7,453,000

& Co.

2015

NP

Tax

$2,592,000

$2,592,000

Privatbank Von
Graffenried AG

2015

NP

Tax

$287,000

$287,000

Ripple Labs, Inc.

2015

NP

Bank
Secrecy
Act

$o

$450,000

RothschildBankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$11,510,000

$11,510,000

SB Saanen BankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$1,365,000

$1,365,000

Schaffhaulser
Kantonalbank

2015

NP

Tax

$1,613,000

$1,613,000

Schroder & Co. Bank
AG

2015

NP

Tax

$10,354,000

$10,354,000

2015

NP

Tax

$9,090

$9,090

2015

NP

Tax

$1,363,000

$1,363,000

2015

NP

Tax

$17,807,000

$17,807,000

KantonalbankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$9,481,000

$9,481,000

Standard Chartered
Bank (Switzerland) SA

2015

NP

Tax

$6,337,000

$6,337,000

Vadian Bank AG

2015

NP

Tax

$o

$4,253,000

ValiantBankAG

2015

NP

Tax

$3,304,000

$3,304,000

Zuger Kantonalbank

2015

NP

Tax

$3,798,000

$3,798,000

Privatbank Reichmuth

SCOBAG Privatbank

AG
Societe Generale Private
Banking (Lugano-

Svizzera) SA
Societe Generale Private
Banking (Suisse) SA
St. Galler
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